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writes Cowen, “would have astonished us
as recently as the 1980s.” He understates
the case; it would have astonished us as
recently as the late 1990s or even the early
2000s.
What about the fake news stories pub-
lished on Facebook during the 2016 elec-
tion?Cowennotes how trivial theywere as
a percentage of user actions andpoints out
that the “more serious”mainstreammedia
sources ran many stories about candidate
Hillary Clinton’s email scandal. He quotes
aColumbia JournalismReview estimate that,
over six days during the campaign, the
New York Times “ran as many front-page
stories about Clinton’s emails as it did
about all policy issues over the sixty-nine
days immediately preceding the election.”
As far as I know, President Trump has not
thanked the Times, but he should.
Moreover, if the electronic media bear
most of the blame for the dreck that they
publish, how shouldwe think about brick-
and-mortar publishers? Cowen notes that
for-profit publishers have printed the
works of Marx, Mao, Hitler, and Stalin.
Those four, indirectly in Marx’s case and
directly for the other three, were respon-
sible for over 100 million deaths in the
20th century. Great line: “Facebookhasn’t
come anywhere near to doing the damage
that the printing press (and radio) did by
helping to communicate the ideas of fas-
cism, Marxism, communism, and so on.”
In that same chapter, Cowen reports on
a debate he hadwithwriterNicholas Carr,
who argues that Google makes us stupid.
The first question that Cowen asked Carr
was whether Carr had prepared for the
debate by using Google to research him.
Writes Cowen, “I thought I had won right
then and there.” Presumably Carr had to
answer “Yes.” From personal experience,
I can say that even if Google hasn’t made
me smart, it has certainly made me more
informed.
Toward the end of the chapter, Cowen
does raise a justified concern that techwill
cause us to lose our privacy. It’s hard to
know how to counter that loss.
One of the book’s best chapters, which
added tomy stock of knowledge, is “What
Is Wall Street Good for, Anyway?” It turns
out to be a lot. Cowen’s section on the
importanceof venture capital in thehistory
of many major companies is eye-opening.
It’s also heartening to see that 55% of U.S.
households own stock, up from 32% in
1989. Cowen also highlights Vanguard’s
positive role in bringing down fees paid to
mutual fund companies. He reports that
people who have invested with Vanguard
have saved $175 billion by not paying the
average active fund fee since 1974, when
Vanguard began. It has also saved investors
about $140 billion through lower trading
costs. I had known that the savings were
large, but I had not known that they were
that large.
The biggest surprise, though, is that,
as one partner in a Swiss law firm put it,
“America is the new Switzerland.” Ameri-
can laws, writes Cowen, have evolved to
produce a high level of secrecy for some
asset holders in this country. And South
Dakota seems to be our ownLuxembourg.
With only 850,000 people, South Dakota
“is home to more than $226 billion in
assets held in trusts.”
I’ve not even mentioned the last two
chapters, “CronyCapitalism” and “If Busi-
ness Is So Good, Why Is It So Disliked?”
They’re excellent also.
All in all, Cowen’s love letter is sorely
needed, not mainly by America’s big busi-
nesses, but by America’s voters. If 30% of
the voters understood even 20% of the
insights in this book, we would likely have
much better policies and Americans, over
time, would be much better o!.
Reinhardt’s Last Book
! REVIEW BY DAVID R. HENDERSON
Uwe Reinhardt was a well-known health economist at Princ-eton University who died in 2017. An outspoken advocate ofgovernment regulation of health insurance, he helped design
the single-payer system adopted by Taiwan’s government.
Reinhardt’s last book is Priced Out: The Economic and Ethical Costs of
American Health Care. In it, he argues
that U.S. health care is too expensive,
its administrative costs are too high, the
U.S. tax system subsidizes health care for
high-income people, and the government
should increase the subsidy for health care
for low-income people. He also expresses
strong skepticism about requiring people
to pay more out of pocket for their own
health care, claiming it will not push con-
sumers to price-shop for care.
Unfortunately, in the book Reinhardt
biases his comparison of drug prices
across countries and says nothing about
the U.S. Food andDrug Administration’s
role in causing high drug prices. In claim-
ing that people won’t price-shop when
their incentives are changed by higher
deductibles, he uses one company’s
experiment to generalize to the whole
country. Yet he himself, with his advocacy
of reference pricing, argues that people
who have to pay out of pocket will price
shop. In discussing the tax treatment of
employer-provided health insurance, he
likens taking advantage of the tax break
to feeding at the public trough. An immi-
grant himself—first from Germany to
Canada, and then from Canada to the
United States—Reinhardt criticizes the
hiring of immigrant doctors. One refresh-
ing proposal, though, is his idea for let-
ting people avoid the A!ordable Care Act
(ACA) and take responsibility for their
own health insurance.
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Drug prices / Reinhardt’s most impor-
tant factual message is that Americans
spendmore per capita on health care than
people in any other country and that the
prices we pay for health care are much
higher than prices elsewhere. He is right
on both counts.
He uses two figures, though, that bias
the comparison for drugprices.Onefigure
shows that the average price for a 30-day
supply of Xarelto, used to prevent or treat
blood clots, is $292 in the United States
versus $126 in the United Kingdom and
$48 in SouthAfrica. Another figure shows
that the average price for a 30-day supply
of Tecfidera, used to treat multiple sclero-
sis, is $5,089 in the United States versus
$1,855 in Switzerland and $663 in theUK.
Those comparisons are biased because
both drugs are brand-name drugs, yet a
large percentage of the drugs Americans
take are generics.
According to an October 2017 study
by the Commonwealth Fund, 84% of the
drugs Americans took in 2014were gener-
ics. The UK percentage was also 84%, but
every other country was much lower. The
lowest in the Commonwealth Fund study
was Switzerland, where only 22% of drugs
taken were generics.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the di!er-
ences in spending on drugs between the
United States and these other countries
were narrower than the brand-name drug
prices would suggest. In 2015, according
to the Commonwealth study, per-capita
spendingonpharmaceuticals in theUnited
Stateswas$1,011.40versus$783.30 inSwit-
zerland and $497.40 in theUK.Onemight
wonder if that’s because thehigherprices in
America give us an incentive to buy a lower
quantity of drugsper person, but theCom-
monwealth study says that’s not so: “Drug
utilization appears to be similar in the U.S.
and the nine other countries considered.”
Disappointingly, inReinhardt’s discus-
sion of drug prices he does not mention
one of the culprits responsible. The FDA
makes prices higher for some drugs by
putting barriers in the way of pharmaceu-
tical companies that make so-called “me-
too” drugs. Frequent Regulation contribu-
Priced Out: The
Economic and Ethi-
cal Costs of American
Health Care
By Uwe E. Reinhardt
201 pp.; Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2019
tor Henry Miller of the Pacific Research
Institute has defended such drugs on the
grounds that no drug is a perfect substi-
tute for another and that, therefore, some
patientswhom the original drugwouldn’t
help would benefit from theme-too drug.
But there’s also a narrow economic argu-
ment for these drugs, one that I’llmake by
analogywith cars: AChevro-
let is ame-too Ford. If a gov-
ernment agency put barri-
ers in the way of Chevrolets,
Fords would bemore expen-
sive. Putting barriers in the
way of me-too drugs gives
pharmaceutical companies
even more market power.
Cost-sharing / Many health
economists, including me,
have proposed reining in
wasteful health care spend-
ing in the United States
by moving to catastrophic
health insurance. Under
this, peoplewouldpay out of
pocket for the first few thou-
sand dollars of each year’s
health-care spending. That
change, many of us have argued, would
encourage patients to be more cost con-
scious, shoppingaround for cheaperdrugs,
asking tougher questions of doctors who
want to order expensive tests, maybe even
choosing hospitals for non-emergency sur-
gery based on costs, and, of course, cutting
out less-important care.
We dohave evidence of this happening.
In the famous RAND health insurance
experiment that ran fromNovember 1974
to January 1982, thousands of peoplewere
given health insurance with wide varia-
tion in co-insurance rates—the percentage
of medical bills paid by the participants
in the experiment. The co-insurance rate
varied from 0% to 95%. The experiment
found that patients faced with higher co-
insurance rates used less medical care, yet
there was little e!ect on health outcomes.
This suggests that people who had to pay
more out of their own pockets cut out the
least beneficial medical care.
Reinhardt doesn’t mention the RAND
experiment, but he calls the idea of shop-
ping for cost-e!ective health care “a cruel
hoax.” He writes, “Patients typically do
not know binding prices and robust data
on the quality of care when they approach
the health care system.” He writes further,
“In e!ect, they enter thatmarket like blind-
folded shoppers pushed into a
department store.” He cites a
2015National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research study that
found that a large company
that had switched to high
deductibles did find health
care spending by its employ-
ees fell by 11.8–13.8%,which is
significant. But, the research-
ers also found, this reduction
wasdue entirely to a reduction
in the quantity of health care
purchased; having patients
be responsible for more of
the cost of their health care
did not cause any increase in
actual price shopping.
There’s an explanation for
this finding that confounds
Reinhardt’s argument. Even
the employees of a large company are just
a tiny percentage of the market. So, pro-
viders, used to figuring out the prices of
health care only after the care is provided,
are not set up to give price information
in advance to those who ask. That likely
would change if high deductibles became
more common.
The bestway to seewhether higher out-
of-pocket costs cause people to price-shop
for health care is to examine a market in
which a large percentage of patients pay
for their own care. One such market is for
LASIK eye surgery. A quick Google search
finds that prices, though not quoted to
the penny, are customarily prominently
displayed on LASIK surgeons’ websites,
which also often o!er financing options.
Why mention prices if people are not
price shopping? Interestingly, after stat-
ing, “Most prices for health care in the
United States are kept as trade secrets
between insurers and providers of care,”
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Reinhardt admits the point about LASIK,
writing, “The only exceptions are said to
occur in the markets for LASIK and cos-
metic surgery, where physicians usually
do apprise patients of prices ahead of the
treatment.” It does seem, therefore, that if
a large percentage of Americans had high
deductibles, a substantial portion of these
consumers would price-shop much more
than they do now.
Surprises / In his discussion of high costs,
Reinhardt points out the awful reality
that patients often get “surprise” medi-
cal bills. They can carefully choose a hos-
pital within their insurer’s network, but
learn only too late that various doctors
on their case were “out of network.” The
result: surprise medical bills that can run
into the thousands of dollars. One partial
solution for this would be for the govern-
ment to allow more vertical integration
in health care so that all of the providers
for a given surgery would be in the same
firm and thus part of its insurance net-
work. One barrier to vertical integration
is Certificate of Need (CON) regulations
that many states have: these laws make it
di"cult for competitors to start hospitals
and surgery centers. Unfortunately, Rein-
hardt doesn’t mention CON regulations.
While on the subject of surprises, I’ll
note one I had in reading the book’s epi-
logue by Reinhardt’s widow, Tsung-Mei
Cheng, a health policy research analyst at
Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of
PublicandInternationalA!airs.Shequotes
Reinhardt’s statement in2009, beforeCon-
gress passed theACA, thatAmerica should
use “reference pricing.” She also quotes
from his lengthy 2009 C-SPAN interview
in which he explained the idea. Insurance
companies would pay 100% of the price of
a low-cost drug or a low-cost hospital visit,
whichwouldbe the “referenceprice.” But if
somepatientswant amore expensive drug
or hospital, they would have to pay the
di!erence between the price of that care
and the reference price. That would give
patients good incentives: their health care
basics would be covered and they would
decide whether the extra quality or luxury
was worthwhile. This seems like a good
idea, but it surprised me that Reinhardt
embraced it because it sounds awfully close
to the notion of price shopping that he
rejected in the book.
One policy that would likely move
insurance companies closer to reference
pricing is to reform the tax treatment of
employers’ contributions to their employ-
ees’ health insurance. The contribution is
a legitimate cost of doing business and,
therefore, for tax purposes is deductible
from the employers’ revenue. But it’s tax-
free income to the employee. That gives
employers an incentive to provide more-
generous health insurance than otherwise.
Reinhardt highlights this fact, but he
calls the tax treatment a “generous public
subsidy.” The people taking advantage of
it, he writes, have “their paws so squarely
in the public trough.” He’s mistaken. It’s
true that in its economic e!ects, the tax-
free treatment of employers’ contributions
acts like a subsidy. But it’s not a subsidy; it’s
away for employees to reduce their tax bill.
While the tax treatment does create bad
incentives, it is no more a subsidy than a
tax rate cut would be. Reinhardt’s implicit
assumption is that the government owns
the employees’ income.
His language on another issue, immi-
gration of doctors, is also disturbing. In
the aforementioned C-SPAN interview, he
stated thatwhendoctorswhohave trained
in other countries move to the United
States, we are “robbing them of their phy-
sicians.”We’re not. When Reinhardt and I
moved to the United States from Canada,
the United States did not “rob” Canada of
budding economists; we immigrated. The
case with doctors is no di!erent.
In her epilogue, Cheng points out
that when Reinhardt was a child in Ger-
many, he and his siblings had health care
through the “social insurance” system that
ChancellorOtto vonBismarck established
back in 1883. She comments, “Germans
may not always have had enough food in
those years, but all had the health care
they needed.” That comment is telling.
There are tradeoffs. Would you rather
spend a dollar on health care or on food,
and who should get to choose? Cheng’s
comment implies, and presumably her
husbandwouldhave agreed, that it should
be the government’s choice and the gov-
ernment should choose health care over
food. Why that’s so is unclear. Elsewhere
in the book, Reinhardt notes that health
care contributes “nomore than 10percent
to 20 percent of observed cross-country
variations” in health status measures.
For some people, especially poor people,
food could easily bemore important than
health care.
Community rating proposal / I’ll end with
a Reinhardt policy idea I like, about how
government should deal with a perverse
incentive that the ACA creates. The ACA
requires insurers that sell individualhealth
insurance policies to practice community
rating. “Community rating” means that
insurance companies charge the same pre-
mium to healthy people that they charge
to unhealthy people. The result, he notes,
is that a high percentage of healthy people
will game the system, refraining frombuy-
ing insurance until they are sick.
The usual solution for this that health
policy analysts advocate is to require the
uninsured to wait months or years before
they can buy community-rated insurance.
Reinhardt takes this idea a step further.He
would require all American residents, at
age 26, to buy community-rated insurance.
If they refuse, they would not be allowed
to buy community-rated insurance at any
time in the future. They would instead go
uninsured or buy insurance priced accord-
ing to risk.
As long as governmentwould not regu-
late the items that individual insurance
would cover, this strikes me as a good
proposal. I could imagine young people
saving a few thousand dollars a year and
then,when they get sick at, say, age 50, hav-
ing tens of thousands of dollars to spend
on health care. I could also imagine them
doing what my daughter did before the
ACA prohibited it: buy risk-priced health
insurance with guaranteed renewability.
Thatwould be a large improvement on the
current system.
